


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Fortitude, Ultra and the 'Need to Know'

RALPH BENNETT

The Second World War began in force and violence – *Blitzkrieg* in Poland and France – and ended when massive industrialization enabled Anglo-American and Russian armies to trample on the Germany which the heavy bombers of the RAF and USAAF had already laid waste. But between the two periods when might alone prevailed there was a long interval during which intelligence and deception were called in aid by the Allies to assist the defensive war on land. To deceive the enemy and lure him to waste his superior strength by vainly beating the air in pursuit of will o' the wisps is the natural recourse of the weaker party as it seeks to compensate for its lack of material power. Yet, as Fortitude showed, and contrary to what is often said, deception is not the province of the weaker party alone;¹ tricks learned for self-protection in adversity can later be used to sharpen a counter-offensive when the balance of power has changed.

Both the Western and the eastern enemies of the Nazi war-machine made extensive use of deception during their years of weakness.² In doing so, the British in Egypt discovered an unexpected aptitude for deceit, reinventing from scratch tricks as old as war itself and refining them with a practical skill which as early as the winter of 1940/41 helped Wavell's tiny Western Desert Force to outwit Graziani's quarter of a million Italians and eject them from Cyrenaica in a campaign lasting only two months but covering 700 miles. There was to be no living up to this standard when Rommel intervened, but 'A' Force, created and directed by Colonel Dudley Clarke at Wavell's initiative, already had a long list of smaller successes to its credit before its deception plan made a major contribution to the victory of Alamein. These were still defensive (often confined to camouflage) and tactical, however. The plan which disguised the strike area of Torch in November 1942 was the first to tackle a larger objective, and the cover-plan for the invasion of Sicily next year the first which attempted widespread strategic deception; the several hundred thousand troops whose presence in the eastern Mediterranean Dudley Clarke simulated for the purpose were still distorting German strategy as late as the summer of 1944. In Italy deception constantly wrong-footed Kesselring about Allied intentions, helping Alexander to fulfil the directives which, in order to reduce pressure in the eastern and western theatres of war, bade him attract as

many Germans to his front as possible but denied him the means to execute the task properly.

Drawing on experience gained during these years, 'A' Force's offspring, the London Controlling Section (LCS), scored the greatest triumph of all when Fortitude hoodwinked Rundstedt and Rommel. Hitler and OKW into believing that the main assault in the summer of 1944 would be round Calais rather than in Normandy. The plan was operated by a tiny handful of men known collectively as Ops B, who worked during the critical months of spring and early summer 1944 in close accord with SHAEF and 21 Army Group.³ Their *modus operandi* was through enemy agents who had been rounded up and 'turned' by the XX Committee to transmit misleading information to their *Abwehr* controllers in the Reich. How the Fortitude story was gradually filtered into the German consciousness was described in the (unpublished) post-war *History of Strategic Deception* by Major R.F. Hesketh, head of the 'special means' section of Ops B.⁴ Hesketh measured its success by the *Abwehr* controllers' replies to the agents' transmissions and by evidence, secured after the war, of OKH's and OKW's acceptance of *Abwehr* deductions about Allied order of battle and intentions.

To think of what one would like the enemy to believe is easy, to find means capable of inducing him to believe it is far more difficult. Nevertheless this problem was solved with outstanding skill. To discover whether the enemy believes the falsehoods with which he is being fed and is acting accordingly, and to do this in time to profit from the knowledge, is a far more formidable task: surprising gaps in Hesketh's *History* seem to imply that Ops B was not much concerned with it or with adjusting its policy in the light of the enemy's revealed beliefs.

If he is to gain any benefit from it, the military commander who has commissioned a deception plan will need to know, before he begins his own operations,⁵ whether the enemy has swallowed the proffered bait or not. How much of the disinformation has been received and accepted as genuine? What consequential moves has the enemy made? Have his suspicions been aroused? This means that if a deception plan is to be of any practical use there must exist in parallel with it an intelligence service capable of relaying news of the enemy's changing moods and measuring the degree of credence he is attaching to the false tale from day to day. Without this foreknowledge the hunter may unbalance his forces by dispersing some of them to inactive sectors of the front for insurance purposes, and thus lose the initiative to his intended prey. Kesselring repeatedly found this in Italy when he more than once vitiated his defensive purpose by setting his strongest divisions to guard coastal sectors which the Allies had no intention of assaulting, unaware that Ultra intelligence was keeping Alexander

informed of the fact. Deception and intelligence complemented each other perfectly, and together formed an integral part of operational planning in the Mediterranean throughout 1943 and 1944. Was this co-operation reproduced at SHAEF and 21 Army Group? Was Ops B involved in the process? It is almost impossible to believe that it was not reproduced for so vital an operation as Overlord, yet the present state of the evidence makes proof equally impossible – and indeed much of it suggests the contrary.

I

Except in the simplest cases, accurate and precisely dated records are indispensable to a historical demonstration that a commander received the intelligence which proved the success of his deception in time for it to determine what he did next. Without it, impressionistic conclusions may misrepresent causality and put the cart before the horse.

Manifestly, Joshua could see the garrison of Ai pursuing him before he raised his spear as a signal for the ambushing detachment to rush the now unguarded walls; similarly Malatesta da Verucchio in an almost identical stratagem of 1291 which established his dynasty in Rimini for nearly two centuries. William the Conqueror could see with his own eyes the success of his trick at Hastings when he decoyed a large body of Saxons away from their defences on Senlac Hill to chase the apparently fleeing Normans into the valley and then suddenly loosed a squadron of cavalry on their flank to cut down the rash pursuers. Far greater problems face the commander, and will face the later historian, when the conflict is on a wider scale and the deception embraces strategy, for visual evidence will not suffice. How is this kind of intelligence to reach the commander secretly and in time? What exactly is the historian to make, for instance, of the contemporary accounts according to which Batu Khan led three Mongol armies to ravage Russia and Europe from the Volga to Silesia and the Danube in 1237–41, so precisely directing their movements that he could recall one of them from a nine days' feigned flight to a perfectly-timed rendezvous with the others outside Budapest for the siege and destruction of the city? We should be compelled to dismiss the story out of hand as either the triumphalist legend of the victors (analogous, perhaps, to the collapse of the walls of Jericho at the sound of the trumpet) or the terrified imaginings of the vanquished embroidering a chance series of unconnected events into a logical cause-and-effect sequence, did not the proven mobility of the Mongol warriors and the 'arrow riders' who carried their generals' despatches entitle us hesitantly to credit a synchronization which would otherwise seem to demand radio communications.

Only precisely dated – even precisely timed – information can satisfy the historian that a commander did *this* because he knew *that*. Even so, he will

scarcely ever be able to discover how a commander reasoned on the basis of his knowledge, for the commander will seldom or never have committed this to writing amid the heat and fury of battle. The criteria for absolute historical certainty are too demanding, and the historian will almost always be reduced to approximations to the truth and intelligent guesswork – which, of course, he has a duty to admit.

II

Since the western Allies expended much effort (Fortitude) in trying to induce the Germans to believe that the Normandy landing (Overlord) in June 1944 was only a diversion and that the main blow would be struck in the Pas de Calais in July, and since Ultra demonstrated that the false tale was being taken for truth and that a strong garrison was being retained in the wrong place, it has been assumed that the two were related as cause to effect and that Ultra was the connecting link between them. There has been plenty of good evidence to support this belief. In the revised edition of his autobiography, for instance, General Bradley wrote: 'Ultra was central to Fortitude's conception and execution and provided a continuous monitor on German reactions to it, telling us whether or not we were really fooling the Germans. . . . Without Ultra to monitor its intricate and interlocking parts, Fortitude could not even have got off the ground'.⁶ This view has recently received formal confirmation. The latest volume of the official history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, published in 1988, says that in January 1944 'arrangements were made for the deception authorities to receive from GC & CS without delay all decrypts that might have a bearing on their work' so that they could '*adjust their deception programme accordingly*' (my emphasis).⁷ Exactly how the linkage was effected, and by means of what decrypts, is not stated, however. *British Intelligence* devotes some 500 pages to the first nine months of 1944, the period during which Fortitude influenced events, but does not provide a single example to illustrate the link or to show how the deception planners used the decrypts with which they were supplied. Because of this omission, and because a great deal of the relevant material cannot be consulted in the Public Record Office, thick darkness surrounds the central question of what intelligence was supplied to the deception planners and by whom, and in consequence a vital part of the explanation for Overlord's success is hidden from view.⁸

Hesketh deepens the mystery when he writes; 'Before the invasion Ultra told us very little of what the enemy believed our dispositions to be'.⁹ Exactly what is meant by 'Ultra'? The term 'Ultra' (with which 'Most Secret Source' is usually taken to be synonymous) was coined in 1940 to describe the information derived from German radio messages encrypted on the Enigma machine. In fact, most of these messages originated with the

German Navy, Army or Air Force.¹⁰ Strictly, therefore, what is commonly called 'Ultra' should be called '*Wehrmacht* Ultra', for other authorities (the *Abwehr*, the police and the *Reichsbahn*, for instance) also used the Enigma machine, and their decrypted Enigma messages can also be called 'Ultra'. In what follows, 'Ultra' will always be used in the sense of '*Wehrmacht* Ultra'.

In the passage already quoted, Hesketh refers to the conversation of Baron Ōshima, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, with Hitler on 27 May 1944 and says that knowledge of it 'was obtained from Ultra (BJ 508 dated 28 May 1944)'. The prefix BJ signified a diplomatic intercepts. From March 1944 onwards some Japanese diplomatic intercepts were given the prefix BAY and included in the Ultra series of signals where appropriate; this report was sent to the usual recipients of *Wehrmacht* Ultra as BAY/KV 179, for instance.¹¹ It almost looks as if Hesketh's knowledge of it was the result of an accidental lapse in the security arrangements for the circulation of sensitive material, since this appears to be an exception to a general rule prohibiting Hesketh's sub-section from knowing about Ultra; Hesketh does not mention (and therefore presumably did not see) three earlier BAY/KVs¹² which closely affected Ops B's work because they inclined to predict an Allied landing in the Fortitude area, nor does he refer to much other, later, material from decrypts of Ōshima's traffic which were sent out over the special secure radio link to SHAEF and 21 Army Group which was otherwise reserved for 'normal' *Wehrmacht* Ultra.

On several other occasions Hesketh equates 'Most Secret Source' with *Abwehr* traffic,¹³ the medium in which Berlin corresponded with the controlled agents. This was at first entirely in hand-cypher, though by 1944 some *Abwehr* stations used Enigma.¹⁴ The *Abwehr* Enigma decrypts were presumably entitled to the Ultra classification, but it is noteworthy that no information from them was ever included in the long series of signals based on *Wehrmacht* Enigma decrypts sent from Bletchley Park to commands abroad, and that to this extent at least it was kept separate from 'normal' Ultra. The crucial question, therefore, is when, where and how were the two brought together and integrated for the purpose of tailoring Fortitude?. Lastly, not once does Hesketh quote or refer to intelligence derived from *Wehrmacht* Ultra decrypts or to the signals which convey intelligence (much of it directly affecting Fortitude) from them to SHAEF and 21 (later, also 12) Army Group from January 1944 onwards.

Hesketh, therefore, cannot have been thinking either of *Wehrmacht* Ultra or of *Abwehr* Ultra when he wrote 'Ultra told us very little'. It must therefore be presumed that he did not know about either (it can hardly be supposed that he knew of them but deliberately suppressed all mention of them when he wrote his *History* four years after the end of the war, for the *History* was intended only for 'in house' circulation). Was he deliberately

kept in ignorance of Ultra by his superiors? It is possible (but in view of his duties very difficult to credit) that he was purposely excluded from the Ultra circle if we first suppose a remarkably severe application of the 'need to know' principle – on the ground, perhaps, that if he saw Ultra regularly a message inspired by him and drafted by the case officer of one of the agents through whom Ops B worked might one day inadvertently include some detail which could make German intelligence (which was then considered to be far better than we now know it to have been) suspect that Enigma had been broken, and that in view of the high stakes for which the Allies were then playing even this slight risk was considered too great to run. Since his immediate superior, Colonel Noel Wild (hitherto Dudley Clarke's second-in-command, who had been posted to England and put in charge of Ops B so that it should benefit from the practical experience which 'A' Force had gained in the Middle East),¹⁵ had long been familiar with Ultra, it is necessary to suppose a knowledge-barrier erected between Wild and Hesketh. The obvious clumsiness of such an arrangement is a measure of our present ignorance of the way things actually worked. It seems calculated to cause awkward relations between the two men and also between Ops B and G(R) at 21 Army Group, which was fully briefed about Ultra and worked in close conjunction with the high-powered intelligence department there, but it can – just – be reconciled with the statement in *British Intelligence*. It cannot be disproved from information at present available, but the suspicion that it is incorrect or at least seriously incomplete is hard to resist.¹⁶

III

Strangely enough, the very first of the Ultra signals relevant to Fortitude bears directly on this question. This signal (the German original was dated 9 January 1944, but it was not decrypted until the 26th) reported that the German Y Service had recently identified several American formations in England, including 1 US Army Group, which was believed to have been still in the United States in early November but was now probably somewhere in the area of the British Southern Command.¹⁷ These apparently routine order of battle identifications were in fact of greater significance for the whole Fortitude operation than Ops B could realize at the time or than has been recognized since. Neither Hesketh nor Masterman mentions it, of course, and *British Intelligence* dismisses it quite briefly.¹⁸ Yet this signal offered Ops B, unsought and without effort on its own part, what proved to be the foundation upon which a great deal of its plan to mislead the enemy would come to rest: for it showed that the Germans were, of their own volition and without prompting, already disposed to credit the existence and even the approximate location of their later bugbear, FUSAG. In January 1944, however, the First United States Army Group, though real

enough, had as yet only a nebulous existence (1 US Army, which had also been identified by German Y and reported in the same signal, was already well established by the same date). It had been set up in skeleton form in October 1943, and was scheduled eventually to take command of the US forces for the Normandy invasion.

In January 1944, then, enemy intelligence was deluding itself into belief in the substantial existence of a large formation which was in reality only a shadow or a skeleton: an intelligence error of major proportions, an error on a scale which any experienced deception staff would have been proud to induce. Yet no one had induced it; the FUSAG deception was not to be launched for another two months.

It is now generally recognized that a deception plan has little hope of success unless its intended dupe is already inclined to believe something of the kind – that is to say, unless it plays on existing fears. Such a predisposition can be powerfully reinforced by suitable procedures, but it is almost impossible to implant new fears by external means. Hesketh recognized this when he wrote ‘We owed our flying start to German predispositions’,¹⁹ and Wild, with his memories of the Mediterranean, could have added that only a few months earlier Mincemeat had owed its success largely to similarly favourable circumstances – the imagined presence of Dudley Clarke’s ‘notional’ divisions in the Middle East. Had Hesketh known about the Ultra signal of 26 January, he would surely have mentioned it in his *History*, because it gave him exactly the *point d’appui* which Ops B was going to need for its plan – in which, of course, FUSAG was to play a cardinal role.

Piquancy is lent to the timing of the 26 January signal, and to the reflection that Ops B apparently set out on the most crucial stage of its task without access to Ultra, when it is remembered that it was only on the previous day (and therefore without knowledge of the 26 January signal) that de Guingand had decided to vary the COSSAC plan so that the threat to the Pas de Calais should in future be represented as the main operation, to take place after D-Day in Normandy. Since 21 Army Group could not plausibly be depicted as controlling two major operations at the same time, this necessitated the creation of a second army group: 12 Army Group now took the place 1 Army Group was to have occupied. From this decision arose FUSAG’s key role (first adumbrated in early February but not fully unfolded until its ‘notional’ order of battle was promulgated on 30 March) and the switch from passive or representational (camouflage) to active (radio) deception.²⁰

The fortuitous coincidence in time of two unrelated happenings which wonderfully complemented each other (though in the theoretical sense they occurred in the wrong order) greatly enhanced the deception plan’s chances of success, for it was now clear that its seed would fall on fertile ground. If

Ops B was in fact denied knowledge of one of them, then its activities must be seen as more dependent on 21 Army Group's direction than has hitherto been realized.²¹

FUSAG appeared in Ultra only three more times (all of them were intercepts of Paris Y Service reports) before D-Day: once each in March, April and May, always without any indication of where its headquarters were believed to be.²² On the last two of these occasions the identification was said to be doubtful (strangely enough, these were the only two which post-dated Ops B's full use of FUSAG for deception purposes). The infrequency and vagueness of the references to FUSAG were presumably the consequence in part of the slow unfolding of its 'notional' existence and in part – notably during the crisis which followed the arrest of 'Artist' in Lisbon on 29 April²³ – of the realization that, because of natural prudence would obviously dictate at least some German preparations in the Pas de Calais, it was imperative not to overdo the threat to that part of the coast too soon, for fear that it might lead the enemy to deduce the opposite and suppose that the real invasion was likely to come somewhere else, probably in Normandy. No serious attempt to use the controlled agents to suggest the part FUSAG was destined to play seems to have been made until May, when Brutus was 'notionally' posted to the FUSAG staff (with the unexpected result that the *Abwehr* became anxious to know more about the composition of 21 Army Group!), and until Second TAF staged a heavy raid on the Pas de Calais on 29 May in order to concentrate attention there²⁴. Ultra had, however, by that time recorded a second bonus point for the future with an OKH report of 22 March that General Patton, the bogey-man about whose whereabouts and employment there was to be so much speculation in the early summer, had returned to England from the Mediterranean and 'been given command of another army'.²⁵

In these circumstances it was natural that Ultra should provide evidence in conformity with the policy which Ops B was then pursuing – to suggest that British and American troops were being concentrated in south-east England, in the hope that the Germans would deduce an intention to land in the Calais area for themselves. The formations named in the nine further pre-D-Day Ultra signals²⁶ (half of which originated with either OKH/Fremde Heere West or OB West) covering order of battle overlap very little with those mentioned in Hesketh's Appendix III, 'British controlled agents' share in compiling German intelligence reports', over the same period. While this may suggest that the controlled agents were less successful in planting information than Hesketh implies, it is also important to note the large number of German errors the signals reveal: among several correct identifications (1 Canadian Army – important because Ops B could 'notionally' detach it from 21 Army Group, to which it really belonged, and place it under FUSAG without shifting

its assembly area – XIX US Corps, 29 British Division and the total of six Allied airborne divisions, for instance) were at least as many which were neither under 21 Army Group for the Normandy assault nor in the bogus FUSAGE set-up. This certainly showed that in this respect Ultra was not giving much helpful feedback on the Pas de Calais deception²⁷ – only the last of the nine signals, on 1 June, suggested it with emphatic reference to ‘an unquestionable *Schwerpunkt*’ in the south-east – but it also revealed unmistakably the ineffectiveness of German Y and direction-finding, and reinforced the suspicion that German intelligence was not up to its job.

In contrast with the order of battle items, several Ultra reports of German defensive measures in May showed signs of anxiety over the Pas de Calais area, and therefore presumably also of the controlled agents’ efforts to suggest it. An exercise carried out between 8 and 10 May, with naval authorities in Calais, Dunkirk and Ostend as participants, assumed a successful Allied landing between Ostend and Bruges, together with heavy air and sea attacks.²⁸ This closely coincided with the views of the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, who toured the defences of northern France about this time and told Tokyo that the Germans expected the main Allied landing between Boulogne and Ostend, with diversionary feints between Le Havre and Cherbourg.²⁹ An OB West appreciation, written just before this, saw the outlook rather differently.³⁰ Having said that agents had recently provided no special information, but instead ‘a plethora of invasion dates’, Rundstedt set out his belief that Allied preparations were centred on Portsmouth and Southampton and that this suggested that the main assault was likely to be delivered between Boulogne and Cherbourg. From the Allies’ point of view, the logic of this conclusion (which, though sound as far as it went, was geographically too wide to be of much operational use for defensive purposes) was offset by two manifest and very revealing errors: first, that it was essential for the Allies to capture large ports, particularly Le Havre and Cherbourg – thus proving that no hint of the Mulberries had crossed the Channel – and secondly that the Allies had shipping-space enough to lift the 20 or more divisions he expected them to use in the first wave (a threefold exaggeration). Lastly, an exercise which assumed an Allied landing between Isigny and Ouistreham (an almost exact forecast)³¹ was less alarming when seen in the context of Rundstedt’s mistakes, Luftflotte 3’s prediction of the Dieppe–Seine area, and another Calais–Ostend exercise between 21 and 27 May.³² The fact that the Isigny–Ouistreham exercise was only one among many carried out in a variety of places tended to confirm that the accidental interception of Exercise Tiger, which took place on similar beaches in Devon in April, had still not led the Germans to useful deductions about the landing area.

Two other matters deserve a brief mention. At the end of the first week in May, German Y picked up Exercise Fabius, the wireless pattern of which

had been set to resemble that which would be used on D-Day very closely, so that the latter might for a crucial hour or so be interpreted as only another exercise. Ultra showed that this hope was not realized, for Rundstedt saw Fabius as simply an experiment with new landing techniques.³³

Fortitude North, the plan to suggest an Allied invasion of Norway, appears to have followed the same pattern as Fortitude South, as far as Ultra was concerned. The possibility of such an operation was mentioned once, on 5 March, when OKM cited OKH's appreciation that there were four, five or six British divisions in Scotland, plus two US divisions in Iceland, and that they might all be used 'for operations in the northern area', probably in central or southern Norway; adequate shipping and air cover could be provided.³⁴ This corresponded well with Ops B's purpose, but OKH's appreciation must have been based on recollections of Operation Tindall, which had been designed to the same end in September 1943, for the new wireless programme to suggest Fortitude North did not come into operation until 22 March, a fortnight after OKH's appreciation was composed.³⁵ The revival of Fortitude North before D-Day was reflected in a signal of 27 May,³⁶ but there seems no reasons to disagree with Hesketh's conclusion that in spite of all the effort put into it Fortitude North had no discernible effect because Hitler was so convinced of a threat to Norway that he had already stationed an unnecessary number of troops there and did not need to reinforce them in 1944.

IV

The output of Ultra, restricted during the spring by the Germans' natural preference for land-lines, rose dramatically from the moment of the invasion – an average of six or seven signals a day in the week preceding 6 June became 20 or 30 immediately afterwards and continued to climb – so that opportunities to discover how deeply the threat to the Pas de Calais had become embedded in the enemy's consciousness and how far it was distorting his appreciation of events became correspondingly greater. First signs were not encouraging. At 1500 hours on 6 June Naval Gruppe West's preliminary reaction was that the disposition of Allied Forces pointed to a further major operation, but during the night extra flak protection was ordered for the Quilleboeuf ferry over the Seine, which seemed to presage its use by troops of 15 Army *en route* for Normandy.³⁷ Further landings were predicted in Norway as well as Belgium,³⁸ and intermittently for ten days from 7 June onwards the army demanded air reconnaissance of the Dutch and Belgian coasts because new landings and a 'thrust towards Belgium' were to be expected, but the vital question was whether armour would move from 15 Army to 7 Army, in what strength and how soon.

There were three Panzer divisions in 15 Army: 1 SS Panzer (Belgium, recently strengthened by some 70 tanks), 116 Panzer (along the Seine between Paris and the sea, at barely half strength) and 19 Panzer (Holland, still being set up).³⁹ The issue on 7 June of new cover-names to 1 SS Panzer, 2 SS Panzer (Toulouse) and 17 SS Panzergrenadier (south of the Loire) was evidently in preparation for a move to Normandy by all three.⁴⁰ The last two soon started off (2 SS, harried by the *maquis*, committing the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane on the way), and 2 Panzer soon followed, but 1 SS Panzer remained in Belgium, under orders to move towards the coast north of Brussels to replace 19 GAF Division (which was going to Italy), and 116 Panzer remained stationary too.⁴¹ Since apprehensions about a landing in Belgium or on the Channel coast continued to be lively,⁴² it was easy to suppose that it was this fear which had halted the two Panzer divisions. Confirmation of this came from a decrypt of 11 June: OKH, still grossly overestimating the strength of 21 Army Group, hesitantly endorsed OKL's forecast (which was not backed by captured documents, Y service or *Abwehr*, as OKH well knew) that FUSAG would shortly land between Seine and Somme so that the two army groups could concert measures for a drive on Paris via St Quentin – the strategy it had long expected the Allies to adopt.⁴³

None of this needs be seen as denying the merit of the long-planned, carefully-phrased and beautifully timed message 'Garbo' sent to his *Abwehr* control at midnight 8/9 June, which forms the showpiece of Hesketh's collection and which has usually been taken to be the reason why 1 SS and 116 Panzer remained where they were:⁴⁴ 'These operations are a diversionary manoeuvre designed to draw off enemy reserves in order to make a decisive attack in another place. . . probably the Pas de Calais'. Garbo's message was passed by Keitel to Hitler, who in consequence cancelled the proposed move of the two divisions. But it was not until Keitel was interrogated in April 1946, and his somewhat grudging and impatient admission that it was this message which caused the change of plan, that the cause-and-effect relationship between the two was known. It is noteworthy that all Hesketh's footnotes in the lengthy passage dealing with this incident refer to material which he was not able to see until the war was over, not to feedback by the *Abwehr* to Garbo in June 1944.⁴⁵

Ultra, on the other hand, continued to provide *current* evidence that German apprehensions of a landing on the 15 Army area were still too lively for them to risk transferring armour to Normandy. The OKH appreciation of 11 June was not decrypted until just after midnight 15/16 June, but before then there were strong indications that German defence policy was unchanged, in the shape of news that 116 Pz was still under 15 Army on the eleventh and had not moved further south than the Somme two days later.⁴⁶ Close surveillance of 116 Pz was maintained for the next fortnight (it

moved frenziedly back and forth several times, but never south of Dieppe). 1 SS unfortunately disappeared from view for a few days, but was still only preparing to move to Normandy on 19 June.⁴⁷

The interdependence of deception and intelligence is vividly illustrated by this episode. Ops B had invested many months of dedicated effort to build up its agents' credit in the hope that when the decisive moment came they would be able to mislead the enemy into holding some of his armour back from Normandy to meet an imaginary second landing. The event proved that they had not laboured in vain. Allied anxieties about the security of the beachhead would undoubtedly have been many times greater during and just after the four days' storm of 20–24 June had Eisenhower and Montgomery not been kept constantly informed that they would not have to face a new and massive armoured onslaught while their supply lines were still half strangled in the aftermath of the damage done by wind and waves. Ultra provided this information almost at once, while it was even more urgently needed than could have been foreseen when Fortitude was devised. The intelligence staffs at 21 Army Group received this vital information and passed it on to Operations; but in the present state of knowledge there is no avoiding the conclusion that Ops B remained ignorant of its own success until after the war was over.

The Fortitude plan had called for the threat of a second landing to be kept alive for three weeks after D-Day. By the end of June however, 15 Army was still strong, and the slow Allied advance – Caen was not captured until the second week in July – made it desirable to hold its formations away from the bridgehead for a longer period.⁴⁸ A new plan, Fortitude South II, was devised for the purpose; it accounted for the appearance of many of the original Fortitude divisions in France by creating two new armies, 4 British and 14 American (both 'notional') under FUSAG in south-east England.

A Foreign Armies West appreciation of 22 June showed that the new plan had a good chance of achieving its aim. FUSAG was still in south-east England, it stated, 20 or more divisions strong (the same as 21 Army Group) and ready for an amphibious assault. No specific target was named, though the Pas de Calais was obviously implied; but, as Hesketh says, 'It mattered little to us where the Germans expected the second landing to take place so long as it dissuaded them from sending 15 Army to Normandy'. Hesketh quotes this appreciation from the Lagebericht West for 22 June, but it was also put out in Enigma and, although decrypted with some unavoidable delay, was in the hands of Eisenhower and Montgomery on the 29th.⁴⁹ On 26 June OB West had been expecting FUSAG to land astride the Somme and derive towards the Seine, co-operating with 21 Army Group in a pincer movement on Paris against weak opposition.⁵⁰ On the last day of June, Foreign Armies West pointed to a diversionary operation in Belgium

as the likely objective of 'Army Group Patton' (Ultra's first definite association of Patton with FUSAG),⁵¹ which would probably attempt a landing in late July but might choose an earlier date; an alternative, mentioned only in passing, was a descent on Jutland, where the slowing down of fortification work was thought to invite an assault.⁵²

Rumours of imminent landings continued to be frequent in late June and early July: Brest on 22 June, Ostend on the 23rd, St Nazaire on the 29th, Flanders on the 30th, Belgium on 2 July (two reports, one from 'agents' who seem not to have been under Ops B's control), Le Havre-Scheldt on 4 July⁵³ – all evidence either that Fortitude South II was having the desired effect or that the same end was being achieved through German fears that the Allies could exploit the advantage they were gradually gaining in Normandy by making a second landing, probably further east than Calais.

An appreciation by the new OB West, von Kluge, drawn up directly he took over from Rundstedt on 17 July, accepted the FUSAG story in its entirety: As soon as the boundary of the bridgehead ran from the lower Orne to Avranches and enough Germans had been attracted thither, FUSAG would be launched against 15 Army. A couple of days later Foreign Armies West agreed: FUSAG, under Patton and up to 35 or more divisions strong, would seek a decision in the Franco-Belgian frontier area.⁵⁴ These were perhaps the first two signals about Fortitude to suffer decryption delays long enough to diminish their strategic value seriously: the first could not be transmitted until 8 August, just as the Mortain battle was about to erupt, and the second not until 12 October, by which time it had of course only historical value.

'When the German line was stabilized at the end of September, the day of strategic deception was over', wrote Hesketh. Masterman preferred 25 October, when the Japanese military attaché in Stockholm reported to Tokyo that FUSAG had been broken up (OKH had already dated this the 21st).⁵⁵ After the great advance across northern France, the over-running of the V-weapon sites, and Arnhem, there was plainly less scope for surprise moves by the Allies and thus for plausible ways to disguise them. Until then, however, it was clear from Ultra that Fortitude South II, together with the brute fact that their seaward flank always lay open to the superior Allied air and naval forces, retained such a firm hold upon the German imagination that it was easy to prolong the threat. Indeed, self-mystification about the number and location of the Allied airborne divisions appears to have been rife in OKH well before Ops B began to play with them in order to suggest that Market Garden would take place a good deal further east than Arnhem. GOC Netherlands predicted just this on 11 September, two days after the correct target had been identified by an unspecified source; news of both was in the hands of all concerned 48 or more hours before the first Allied airdrop.⁵⁶ Foreign Armies had counted ten airborne divisions (six

British, four American – twice the real number) a month earlier, believed that they had recently been reinforced, and was still apprehensive about 14 Army; on 7 September the GAF was convinced that FUSAG controlled these divisions and would use them to launch an attack on the North German coast, Denmark or southern Norway.⁵⁷ Fears of air-landings in Jutland or Kiel Bay and on the Dutch coast as far east as the Friesian islands – the latter on the day after Market Garden began – were only available after they had lost all operational value.⁵⁸

V

Ops B's primary method of work was to put out, through the controlled agents, false locations for Allied corps and divisions, hoping thereby to induce the enemy to make wrong deductions about Allied strategy. When he examined German records after the war, Hesketh found evidence to show the success of this ploy. Ultra, on the other hand, lends little support to the effectiveness of order-of-battle items, and its merit (as already indicated) lies rather in revealing some of the more general appreciations into which OKH's and OB West's intelligence staffs digested the information they gathered from all the sources open to them.

None the less, Ultra was able to show that several real formations had been identified before D-Day, some belonging to FUSAG, and others which were entirely fictional⁵⁹. Hesketh's party would no doubt have profited in two ways from knowing the numbers of the 20 or so Allied formations thus identified before D-Day and the many more thereafter. Except for what they could infer from the questions asked of the agents by their regular correspondents, the *Abwehr* control stations in Hamburg and Madrid (and these could only be treated as authoritative on the large assumption that in spite of successive convulsions in the German intelligence establishment the reputation of the *Abwehr* remained high), Ops B had no means of knowing whether their fictional story had been believed or not; and secondly, errors by the Germans might sometimes be as instructive as correct reasoning. The 'knowledge-barrier' which, it was suggested above (see p.487) separated Hesketh from Wild, evidently denied him this information. The remarkable success of Fortitude obscures the fact that Hesketh could have used Ultra's revelations to sharpen his technique and thus have made the deception more effective still.

None of this category of Ultra information lived up to the promise of the early Ultra about FUSAG, however. This being so, and in view of the largely disappointing nature of Hesketh's Appendix XIII (which lists the agents' contribution to German intelligence) – as well as the fact that none of it was available to him until 1946 – it is permissible to wonder whether a considerable amount of the patient care over precise order-of-battle detail

was not wasted effort and whether, had Hesketh and his colleagues been able to see and analyse Ultra, they might not have redirected some of their efforts into more profitable channels⁶⁰ (the trouble they took over 1 Canadian Army does not seem to have been worth while, for instance). Given that they had to credit German intelligence with greater abilities than we now know it possessed, and given that they apparently had scarcely any means of discovering whether the seeds they had sown were taking root, their actions were prudent and right. Masterman was nearer the truth than perhaps he realized when he wrote (though in a slightly different context), 'It is probable. . .that we erred on the side of over-elaboration and excess'.⁶¹

The cancellation of Fortitude North in July and the transfer of its notional troops from Scotland to Sussex and then to East Anglia shows Ultra in a more helpful light. The fictitious British 4 Army, which supposedly moved south in mid-July, appeared in Ultra on the 24th, only a week after the story was first put out by agents; 14 US Army, its imaginary partner, followed a month behind, together with several of its component divisions. Acceptance of this piece of disinformation must have been one reason why Fortitude survived so long – far longer than had been bargained for – but its usefulness to the Allies will have been restricted by the delay in its availability: the news about 14 Army could not be signalled until 9 August.⁶² The delay may well have been due in part to the huge quantity of urgent operational material – to which priority of handling had of course to be given – which deluged Hut 3 between COBRA at the end of July and the capture of Antwerp on 3 September, but decryption difficulties will probably also have been partly responsible.⁶³

VI

A firm, if of necessity only provisional, conclusion follows from all this: the interrelation of Ultra and Fortitude, and the influence of Fortitude upon events, are both far less clear than has been supposed.

That information from Most Secret sources was made available to the Fortitude planners cannot be doubted: the manifest absurdity of not doing so, together with the authoritative testimony quoted above, makes this certain. But what intelligence? If *Wehrmacht* Ultra, why is there so little trace of its having been used? On *Abwehr* Ultra, including the messages from the double agents' German controllers, no useful comment can be made in the absence of all documentation. These must have been the two prime sources, but the contrast between them must be prominently borne in mind: subject to familiar problems of understanding and interpretation, *Wehrmacht* Ultra was 'hard' information, reflecting the actions or intentions of operational commanders or their subordinates; *Abwehr* decrypts, on the other hand,

like all information from every state's secret services and their agents, bore no known or constant relation to action. There could be no certainty that Garbo's message of 8 June would be passed on by the *Abwehr* to OKW, still less that OKW would regard it as reliable or that Hitler would act upon it; nor could Garbo's controller guarantee this in his reply.

On the Allied side information is lacking about how [incoming] intelligence was utilized in the framing of [outgoing] strategy and tactics. Speculation – guesswork – has to replace rational deduction from evidence, and so inevitably risks errors of unknown magnitude. Hesketh focused on one aspect of risk when he wrote, 'It is always tempting for those who set out to deceive, and who see their projects fulfilled, to claim the credit for their attainment when in fact the motive force lay in another quarter. . . . At all times the writer has kept before him the boast of Aesop's fly as he sat upon the axle-tree'.⁶⁴ But can the fly's mistake ever be wholly avoided? The desired result came about. Did the one cause the other? For proof that it did, Hesketh relied on the Garbo message of 8 June⁶⁵ and on Keitel's reluctant admission that the Panzer divisions' move westward was cancelled because of it. Keitel made the admission to a single interrogator, Roger Hesketh's brother Cuthbert, on 18 April 1946⁶⁶, halfway through the Nuremberg trials at a time when he had reason to fear that the death sentence might be pronounced against him. His mind was focused on his own future fate, not on past history, and he was hardly in a frame of mind to review his recollections objectively, especially to an interrogator who clearly hoped for a particular answer. His words are a very slender thread to support the weighty conclusion that Garbo and Fortitude alone kept the Panzer divisions back.

Garbo, moreover, has a rival who should not be underestimated. As keeper of the OKW War Diary, the distinguished medieval historian, Professor Percy-Ernst Schramm, saw a great many intelligence reports and was privy to some, though not all, discussions at the *Fuehrerhaupt quartier*. Schramm singled out 'Josephine' (the brainchild of a journalist living in Stockholm whose reports were based on nothing but open sources and his own lively imagination) as of particular merit and dismissed all the other agents as tools of the Allies.⁶⁷ How much weight should we attach to so well-placed a witness?

Behind the agents' reports and Hitler's intuition lay the sound rational calculation that the invasion convoys could be guaranteed the greatest protection if they took the shortest sea crossing. In late 1943 Jodl plotted all the invasion-sites predicted by agents on a six-foot-long map of Europe, and found that he had left scarcely an inch of the coast blank between northern Norway and the Franco-Spanish frontier.⁶⁸ In circumstances of such uncertainty, would not fundamental strategic principles have become even more prominent than usual? They pointed (as COSSAC discovered

that same autumn) to Normandy and the Pas de Calais as the best places for a landing. Precisely because deception must attach itself like a parasite to a body already sick, it cannot later claim to be the sole cause of the patient's death. There is a good deal less cogency to a claim that Fortitude alone kept reinforcements away from Normandy than to a claim that Mincemeat alone kept them away from Sicily, for there the cause/effect relationship can be much more firmly established.⁶⁹

In the past, attention has usually been mainly directed towards answering the question: did Fortitude achieve its purpose? it is plain that the available evidence does not entitle us to answer with a completely confident affirmative. Another question of at least equal importance has been given far less attention: how soon did SHAEF know how much of Fortitude's purpose was being achieved, and what use was made of the knowledge? Yet the answer to this second question mattered supremely at the time to the commanders engaged, and even the historian writing many years later needs to know the answer to it if he is to assess the commanders' actions fairly. For deception is nothing but the handmaid of operations, as Dudley Clarke constantly emphasized: an indispensable handmaid perhaps, but one with no independent life of her own. Deception has no other purpose than to secure practical benefits.

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Third International Conference on Intelligence and Military Operations at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in May 1988. I am grateful to those who took part in the discussion, particularly Professor Michael Handel and Mr Tom Cabbage, for helpful suggestions.

1. According to David Mure, it was an axiom of Dudley Clarke, the founding father of Second World War deception, that 'intelligence is not a weapon which is fully effective in defence' (D. Mure, *Master of Deception* (London: Kimber, 1980), p.85).
2. The Russians' use of deception is only now becoming known. See David M. Glantz, 'The Red Mask: The Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.2, No.3(1987), pp.175-259.
3. The command organization may be briefly summarized as follows: Ops B was set up as part of COSSAC in April 1943 to deal with all deception measures, physical as well as 'special means' (we are concerned here only with the latter). Ops B presented its 'special means' proposals to the LCS, which then prescribed the appropriate channel by which they should be passed to the enemy. Soon after Ops B was absorbed into SHAEF on the latter's formation in January 1944, LCS cut out a stage in the process by arranging for Ops B to work direct to B1A, a section of M15 which managed controlled agents. When Eisenhower delegated invasion planning to 21 Army Group in February, Ops B came under 21 Army Group's authority; henceforward 21 Army Group had to approve every piece of information it proposed to 'leak' through the controlled agents. Ops B's immediate contact contact at 21 Army Group was an intelligence section entitled G(R).
4. See T.L. Cabbage, 'The Success of Operation Fortitude: Hesketh's History of Strategic Deception', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.2, No.3 (1987), pp.327-46. The Hesketh report is not mentioned in either the text or the bibliography of F.H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1979-88).

5. This seemingly obvious precaution, which had always been taken by Dudley Clarke – to whom 'The value of intelligence is in exact proportion to its operational value' (Mure, p.180) – seems to have lost prominence in the eyes of some modern theorists, distracted from practical realities by an earnest but misconceived search for a general theory of deception: see, for instance, D.C. Daniel and K.L. Herbig, 'Propositions on Military Deception', in John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter (eds.), *Military Deception and Surprise* (London: Frank Cass, 1982), pp.155–77.
6. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), pp.219–20.

Others had written in the same sense earlier, but with less authority, and none had made any attempt to explain how intelligence and deception were integrated: for instance, Mure, pp.98, 101; C. Cruickshank, *Deception in World War II* (Oxford: 1979), p.213; R. Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp.316–19 (in this passage Lewin uses 'Ultra' to mean both *Abwehr* and *Wehrmacht* Ultra, and quotes *Abwehr* messages in inverted commas without indicating where he saw them).

7. Hinsley *et al.*, *British Intelligence*, Vol.iii, 2(1988), p.45; cf. 177–8.
8. It is plain from Hinsley that a good deal of high grade non-CX/MSS Sigint material bearing on Fortitude was passed over the normal Ultra signals channels. This material seems to have consisted mainly of Japanese diplomatic decrypts, the contents of which were classed as Ultra and signalled at first as AWLs and from March 1944 as BAY/KVs (Hinsley *et al.*, *British Intelligence*, Vol.iii, 2, p.50n). In addition some CX/MSS material seems to have been signalled in the pre-invasion months as AWLs, although the main body was passed as KVs (this seems a legitimate inference from the footnotes in Hinsley). Ops B, however, dealt with agents belonging to the *Abwehr*. Their controllers in Hamburg and elsewhere sent them instructions and commented on their replies. Some at least of this correspondence will have been included in the *Abwehr* traffic (some Enigma, some hand-cypher) decrypted at Bletchley as ISOS and ISK. By 1943 3000 of these decrypts were being handled daily (Hinsley, *British Intelligence*, Vol.ii, p.20, cf. Vol.iii, 1, p.141). There is very little mention of this traffic in Hinsley, and the decrypts are not in the Public Records Office.
9. Hesketh, p.95n.
10. Translations of these decrypts were given CX/MSS (earlier CX/IQ) serial numbers; signals to commands based on them were transmitted as KV, XL, etc.
11. Hinsley, Vol.iii, 2, pp.50n, 61.
12. BAY/KVs 97, 103 and 123, printed in full in Hinsley, Vol.iii, 2, pp.787–92.
13. Hesketh, pp.70n, 92, etc.
14. Hinsley, Vol.ii, p.20, cf. Vol.iii, 1, p.141. It is worth noting that there is very little mention of *Abwehr* decrypts (known in Bletchley jargon as ISOS and ISK) and information from them in Hinsley, although by 1943 some 3000 decrypts were being handled every day (Hinsley, Vol.ii, p.20).
15. Hesketh, Introduction, p.2; Mure, Foreword (by Noel Wild), pp.242–3; D. Wheatley, *The Deception Planners* (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp.179–81, 187.
16. In a (regrettably fruitless) endeavour to unravel the mystery surrounding the use of Ultra in Fortitude, I have corresponded with some of those intimately concerned. My correspondence with Major Hesketh was cut short by his death after a first formal exchange of letters. Colonel (now the Rev. Canon) Strangeways, formerly head of G(R) at 21 Army Group, was not confident of the accuracy of his memory after more than forty years, and consequently preferred not to give me an answer. I am grateful to them for their friendly response to inquiries from a total stranger.

Over 100 signals bearing directly on Fortitude had been passed to SHAEF and 21 Army Group by the time the advance slowed down after Arnhem: 25 or 30 before D-Day, between 50 and 60 in June, 30 more by the end of September. Most of the thousands of other signals passed to Western commands during the same months were relevant in one way or another. Since the Germans preferred to use land-lines when possible, there were far fewer intercepts in April and May than later: the pre-D-Day intercepts must therefore be regarded as a rather chance selection, put out in Enigma by radio when bombing or sabotage had interrupted other means of communication.

17. VL 4834. I drew attention to this signal ten years ago in my *Ultra in the West* (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p.53, but lacking knowledge then of the 'notional' Allied order of battle, did not recognize its full significance.
18. Hinsley, Vol.iii, 2, pp.48–9. Hesketh, writing in 1949, indeed comments on the Ōshima decrypt already cited in these words: 'This conversation provided us with one of the *rare instances* where we obtained, before D-Day, a really valuable insight into the enemy's thoughts' (Hesketh, p.95n; my emphasis). Note that the Ōshima decrypt in question referred to a conversation of 27 May, *five months after* the January signal mentioned in the text above.
19. Hesketh, p.81.
20. Hesketh, pp.46–51.
21. This dependence accorded, however, with the first of Dudley Clarke's ground rules (Mure, p.273).
22. KVs 190, 3067, 3372.
23. Hesketh, p.57.
24. Hesketh, pp.61, 63.
25. VL 9732. Hesketh (p.90), it may be noted, quotes this only from the Lagebericht West, which he did not see until after the war. Ops B began to present Patton as commanding FUSAG much later, on 31 May (Hesketh, p.64). Once more, German apprehensions antedated Ops B's attempts to induce them, and Ultra had revealed them long before Ops B exploited them.
26. VLs 6878, 9017, KVs 190, 353, 3067, 3372, 5792.
27. *Abwehr* decrypts may, of course, have given more, but they cannot be consulted at present. Hesketh mentions none in his Appendix XIII, relying instead entirely on documents captured after May 1945 as an index of the extent to which the agents' reports penetrated the German intelligence system.
28. KVs 3434, 3552, 3382.
29. BAY/KVs 97, 103, 123, signalled between 8 and 13 May, BI iii/2 787–792. Luftflotte 3 was predicting a landing between Le Havre and Cherbourg at this time: KVs 3242, 3281. There seems to have been specially lively debate about probable invasion sites and corresponding defence measures during the first half of May. It was now that Rommel told Rundstedt that Normandy could not be reinforced by drawing in troops stationed on either flank because there were not enough of them, and asked for operational control over the OKW reserve, a request that was refused. Hitler was at this time expecting the first landings to aim to capture Cherbourg and Brest; he later preferred Normandy (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, *Kriegstagebuch* (OKW/KTB) iii/2 301–3).
30. KV 3763, signalled 14 May. KVs 773, 5689 are also relevant.
31. It is important to remember that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, precautions like these are likely to have been the consequence of strategic prudence based on topographical probability rather than on specific intelligence, genuine or planted. Similar caution is required in order to avoid hindsight in interpreting certain items of intelligence.
32. KVs 2273, 4728, 5446. Ops B had, in fact, firmly planted the threat from southeast England in the German mind by now, but of course this could not be known to them, to SHAEF or to 21 Army Group with any degree of certainty.
33. KVs 3372, 3763. Hesketh (p.93) arrives at the same conclusion.
34. VL 9126.
35. Hesketh, pp.33–42, 75–83.
36. KV 5406.
37. KVs 6635, 6822.
38. KVs 6724, 6834, 7364, 7381, 7431, 7535, 8415, Hesketh, pp.69–70.
39. OKW/KTB iv. 301.
40. KVs 6933, 6958.
41. KVs 7593, 7986, 8024.
42. KVs 6724, 7071, 7305, 7312, 7535.
43. KV 8250. This was an extraordinarily maladroitness assessment. The COSSAC planners, though unable to inspect any of the possible landing sites, had at an early stage ruled

out all the beaches but those in Normandy and the Pas de Calais as quite unsuitable for the large-scale landing operations. The German staffs, able to visit them at leisure, seem not to have realized that the stretch of coast between Somme and Seine was unfitted for the purpose they were assigning to it, as indeed the Dieppe raid of 1942 had demonstrated. The absurdity of the forecast quoted in the text was presumably at once apparent to SHAEF and 21 Army Group (L.F. Ellis, *Victory in the West* (London, 1962), Vol.i, pp.15–16; Hesketh, p.115). An equally ridiculous error was made during the last stages of the war in Italy. At the end of March 1945, OB Southwest moved one of his best divisions to stand guard against a landing north of the river Po, an action which, by weakening his centre simplified the final Allied breakthrough which overwhelmed him. The Allied deception planners had sought to suggest such a landing. Alexander's naval advisers had told him – what the Germans apparently did not realize – that the water was too shallow for a landing (Alexander, *Despatch* (in *London Gazette* 12 June 1950), p.2959n).

44. Hesketh, pp.55, 100–4.

45. Hesketh, Introduction, pp.5–6, 102–4. In a footnote on page 78 of his report, Hesketh wrote: 'The daily OKH Lageberichte provide by far the most valuable evidence for the progress of Fortitude'. See also Lewin, p.318.

46. KVs 7592, 7982

47. KVs 8881, 9058.

48. Hesketh, pp.116–18.

49. Hesketh, p.114, XL 103.

50. XL 356, signalled 1 July.

51. 'Josephine', the fictional agent invented by Dr Kraemer, a German journalist living in Stockholm, had named Patton as commander of FUSAG on 19 June (Hesketh, p.146).

52. XL 688. The German military attaché in Stockholm had already suggested Denmark (XL 690).

53. XV 9329, XLS 103, 202, 322, 498, 500, 502, 2287, 3921.

54. XL 5226, HP 3119.

55. Hesketh, pp.153,157; J.C. Masterman, *The Double Cross System* (Yale, 1972), p.158. Physical (i.e. tactical) deception measures became effective once more in consequence, as in the desert. They had not proved of much value for Fortitude hitherto, because the decline of the Luftwaffe meant that they were not likely to be noticed from the air. In the west the GAF was 'virtually unable to carry out overland reconnaissance in 1944', and had done very little since 1941, so that no amount of physical deception – tents, dumps, 'Big Bobs' (inflatable dummy landing craft) and so on – could suggest Fusag. Nevertheless, SHAEF would run no risks in March, and OKW believed that 'a single photo reconnaissance flight over the ports of embarkation could give more information than a whole group of agents' (Hinsley, Vol.iii, 2, p.43; Hesketh, p.44, OKW/KTB iv, 1800).

56. HPs 242, 461; Hesketh, p.147.

57. XLS 7215, 7540, 9503.

58. HPs 1376, 1459.

59. VL 9017 of 3 March – V and VIII US Corps, 2 Canadian, 28 and 52 British Divisions, for instance; KV 5792 of 7 May – 10 US Division.

60. Masterman, pp.28–9. If this is so, then Dudley Clarke's maxim that the building-up of a false order of battle 'must be the first task of all for a deception staff, and it must go on unceasingly' (Mure, p.274) would need revision. For straightforward intelligence work, to discover the enemy's actual order of battle was of course always a primary and essential task.

61. Masterman, p.28. All such speculation is confused, however, by the mystery which still surrounds the *Abwehr* decrypts. What did they have to say? To whom was the information from them imparted? How, and by whom, was it amalgamated with other intelligence? Final judgement must of necessity be postponed until these things are known – that is to say, until Professor Howard's official *History of Deception* is released for publication.

62. XLS 6212, 8937, 9540, HP 513.

63. One other feature of the late summer and early autumn attracted much attention at the

time. The great majority of German Y Service reports were derived from intercepts of the radio traffic of American formations, which suggested suggested lax security on their part and gave needless assistance to German intelligence; the same phenomenon had long been evident in Italy.

64. The fly boasted that he, and not the wheels of the chariot, raised the cloud of dust.
65. The message bears upon its face proof that Hitler saw it, but none of his subsequent actions.
66. Cabbage (p.334) prints Cuthbert Hesketh's account of the interview.
67. OKW/KTB iv, 1798. On Josephine, see Horst Boog, 'Josephine and the Northern Flank' in *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol.4, No.1(January 1989), pp.137-60. Drawing on the vast resources of the *Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt* in Freiburg, Dr Boog shows convincingly that in Norway, even more than in France, German moves to counter threats of invasion were occasioned more by Hitler's convictions and by naval and military strategic considerations than by London-based deception, of which they were virtually independent. (Unless Josephine was indeed a controlled agent, despite Hesketh's denials. At one point (p.152) Dr Boog uncharacteristically abandons his usual rigid documentary technique for a 'must have been' to suggest this. He cites no concrete evidence to support his suggestion.) German apprehensions, it appears, were at their most acute in autumn and winter 1944/45; yet Fortitude North was effectively ended in July, and finally wound up in September (Hesketh, p.77). By that time, some German intelligence circles had begun to question Josephine's credibility, Dr Boog shows, but naval and military authorities were more apprehensive than ever of an invasion of Norway. His greater familiarity (because of his position at Führerhauptquartier) with official apprehensions than with the scepticism of a few may account for Schramm's opinion.
68. OKW/KTB iv, 1798.
69. See Chapter 9 of my *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton/New York: William Morrow, 1989), pp.222-7.